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Abstract
The money markets are at the heart of the recent financial crisis and are the subject of
substantial news coverage. However, much of what was reported showed a lack of
understanding of money markets in general and, a specific lack of understanding as to
why the financial crisis unfolded as it did in these markets. The purpose of this paper is
to discuss what actually happened and why. Specifically, we discuss: (1) the economic
role of the money markets, (2) the institutional features of the money markets central to
the financial crisis and, (3) what actually happened in the various money markets.
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A Crisis of Confidence:
Understanding the Money Markets during the Financial Crisis
BNP Paribas, a large French bank, temporarily halted redemptions from three of its
funds holding assets backed by US subprime mortgage debt on August 9, 2007 signaling
the beginning of the financial crisis which had been looming, unknown to the public, for
several months.1 Quoting from the BNP press release on that day, “(t)he complete
evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the U.S. securitization market has
made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their quality or credit
rating.” The next day, the interest rate spread of overnight asset-backed commercial
paper over the Federal funds rate increased from 10 basis points to 150 basis points and
the Federal Reserve Board announced it would provide the necessary liquidity to promote
trading in the federal funds market close to the target rate of 5.25%.
One week later, on August 16, 2007 Countrywide Financial (then the largest US
mortgage lender) announced it had borrowed $11.5 billion from a group of 40 banks.
The loan was necessitated by Countrywide’s inability to borrow in the commercial paper
market, as it had done regularly in the past. To provide some context for the size and
importance of this event, consider that, earlier that year on March 31, 2007, Countrywide
held $208 billion in total assets with $32.2 billion in Mortgages Held for Sale and $16.8
billion in Trading Securities Owned.2 These trading accounts were funded in part with
$9.8 billion in asset-backed commercial paper and $8.7 billion in unsecured commercial
paper. Thus, commercial paper represented almost 40% of the funding of Countrywide’s
trading assets just prior to the financial crisis.3
On the following day (August 17, 2007), a Federal Reserve Board press release
stated:
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“To promote the restoration of orderly conditions in financial markets, the Federal
Reserve Board approved temporary changes to its primary credit discount window
facility. . . (and) a 50 basis point reduction in the primary credit rate to 5¾ percent,
to narrow the spread between the primary credit rate and the Federal Open Market
Committee's target federal funds rate to 50 basis points. The Board is also
announcing a change . . . to allow the provision of term financing for as long as 30
days, renewable by the borrower. These changes will remain in place until the
Federal Reserve determines that market liquidity has improved materially.”

Money markets being at the center of the financial crisis meant substantial media
coverage in both the financial and popular press as the crisis progressed. However, much
of what was reported about the money markets showed a lack of understanding of money
markets in general and a specific lack of understanding as to why the financial crisis
unfolded as it did in those markets. Specifically, unlike previous bank panics when bank
runs were retail in nature - runs instigated by individuals rushing to withdraw their funds
on deposit and the banks failing because they were unable to meet those demands - the
2007-2009 financial crisis was ‘wholesale’ in nature. This panic involved financial firms
creating runs on other financial firms primarily (as discussed later) by not renewing
repurchase agreements (repos) or by increasing the repo margin (Gorton, 2009a, 2009b).
The purpose of this paper is to highlight how the financial crisis played out in the
money markets. We begin with a discussion of the economic role of the money markets,
as it drives the market structure. We then turn to a brief description of how money
market mutual funds (MMFs), the traditional banking sector, and the “shadow” banking
sector interact within the money markets and how this resulted in a substantial increase in
the number, outstanding amount, and liquidity of traditional money market instruments.
Finally, we discuss each major money market instrument that was significantly affected
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by the crisis, how each market responded to the financial crisis, and any actions taken to
counteract the impact of the crisis.

I.

The Economic Role of Money Markets
The structure of the money markets stems from the unique role they play in the

trading of liquidity. These are the primary markets where lenders with temporary cash
surpluses make short-term loans to borrowers with temporary cash shortages.
The key feature is that lenders (investors) have temporary cash surpluses. Often,
this cash surplus is associated with a specific obligation in the near future (less than one
year) and the lenders will only make a loan if they are confident that the cash will be
returned in time to cover the identified liability. Because payment of the obligation is
vital to the ongoing financial health of the lender, the temporary cash surplus will not be
put at undue risk. A simple analogy is a homeowner who receives a bi-monthly paycheck
but has monthly mortgage payments at the beginning of each month. A portion of the
mid-month paycheck goes toward the mortgage payment, but will not be needed for two
weeks. The homeowner can allow the cash to sit idle for two weeks or can invest as long
as the cash is certain to be available later to satisfy the mortgage liability. Because there
is a specific time horizon for the investment and because the funds are needed for a
specific purpose, default risk is unacceptable.
This demonstrates the mindset of money market investors and highlights the three
primary characteristics common to all money market securities, namely:
1. Short-term debt contracts with
2. Low default risk and
3. High marketability.
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Using short-term debt contracts allows lenders to schedule precisely the return of their
temporary cash surpluses. Because the cash meets an identified need, lenders will only
lend to low default-risk borrowers. Finally, since unforeseen cash obligations can arise,
lenders also require the ability to get their funds returned early without significant
penalties or price concessions. If these three features cannot be met satisfactorily, lenders
will decline to make the loan rather than put their temporary surplus at risk.
Understanding this last point goes a long way in appreciating why the money markets
supposedly “locked up” during the recent financial crisis. To emphasize the importance
of confidence in the money markets and financial markets overall, consider the following
quote from the Examiner’s Report on the underlying causes of the Lehman Brothers
failure:
Lehman failed because it was unable to retain the confidence of its lenders and
counterparties and because it did not have sufficient liquidity to meet its current
obligations.4

II.

The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds, Banks, and Shadow Banking
The trading of liquidity requires the matching of short maturity lenders with short

maturity borrowers, for example the funding inventory with commercial paper. Thus,
money market borrowers convert short-term assets to cash to repay the short-term
lenders.5 The normal minimum transaction size in the money markets is $5 million
which makes trading in traditional money market securities out-of-reach for most noninstitutional short-term lenders.
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A. Money Market Mutual Funds
We begin our discussion with money market mutual funds (MMF) which are
large institutional portfolios that hold money market securities. In holding these shortterm securities there is no maturity intermediation rather, the benefit of MMFs is one of
denomination intermediation. That is, MMFs pool funds from many investors (lenders) to
acquire money market securities. They allow individual investors to participate in small
dollar increments (typically $100).
The portfolio of assets in a MMF also provides some diversification benefits, but
not in the traditional sense of ‘up’ stocks offsetting ‘down’ stocks because an ‘up’ money
market security is one that repays the lender and a ‘down’ one is one that defaults.
Instead, the diversification is simply that investors do not have all of their funds in one
security.

Rather, they have a claim on the entire MMF thus providing some risk

reduction. However, MMF investors are exposed to liquidity risk as there is not a
secondary market for MMF shares and funds have the ability to deny withdrawals.
Data from the Federal Reserve H6 release shows total assets of MMFs in
December of 2006 at $2.18 trillion. This amount increased to $3.51 trillion in December
of 2008, but has declined through the recession to $2.60 trillion in December 2010.

B. Banks
Banks take (predominantly short-term) deposits which they bundle to fund a
portfolio of loans and provide denomination, risk and maturity intermediation. Banks
take deposits in any dollar amount allowing anyone wanting to store liquidity a place for
that storage (denomination intermediation).

Depositors have a claim on the bank

(supported by its portfolio of loans) which provides risk intermediation and, banks take in
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relatively short-term deposits that vary from demand deposits to multi-year time deposits
while making relatively long-term loans that extend as far out as 30 years for mortgages
(maturity intermediation).
Having a claim against the bank and its loan portfolio instead of a specific
borrower reduces depositors’ risk, but does not eliminate it. To further reduce risk and to
provide for a safe and sound banking system, the US has a deposit insurance system
through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to protect depositors. Prior to
the financial crisis, MMF investors did not have these same protections. One of the
programs designed to limit the financial crisis is a program of assurances to MMF
investors that their funds are safe.
Maturity intermediation creates an exposure to liquidity risk because depositors
can withdraw their funds before loans mature and banks are required to meet all
withdrawal requests. To manage the liquidity risk, banks hold both cash and money
market securities. However, MMFs hold little cash because of the need to generate
returns and instead, generally meet withdrawals from new inflows, from maturing money
market securities or from selling money market securities.
Gorton (2009a, 2009b) points out that traditional banks also produce
“informationally insensitive” debt that can be used for transactions.6 In the extreme,
these securities are quasi-risk-free, like insured deposits. But other types of debt can also
have this characteristic. For example, studies of corporate bond returns and bond yield
changes have generally concluded that investment-grade bonds behave in a fashion
similar to that of Treasury bonds when reacting to interest rate changes. In contrast,
below investment grade bonds are more sensitive to firm-specific information.
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An investment grade bond can suffer losses if the issuer fails but, if the security
represents a portfolio of bonds where the firm can segregate specific cash flows and sell
claims specifically linked to these cash flows, which can be accomplished by setting up a
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) as discussed below, then the ‘informationally insensitive’
characteristic can be retained. Other important characteristics of the traditional banking
sector include the exponential development of the market for derivatives and its
concomitant demand for collateral (for hedging and margin purposes) and perhaps just as
importantly, the movement of massive amounts of loans originated by banks into the
capital markets in the form of securitization and loan sales (discussed in the following
section).

C. Shadow Banking
Pozsar et al. (2010) define shadow banks as financial intermediaries that, like
traditional banks, conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation, but do not have
access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees such as deposit
insurance. They report the size of the shadow banking system peaked at $20 trillion in
March 2008, more than 1.5 times the asset of traditional banks.
In the shadow banking sector, funds are borrowed and used to invest in portfolios
of relatively long-term assets. One of the main providers of funds to this sector is the
MMFs, which creates a number of notable issues:
[1] Investing in relatively long-term assets moves away from the types of assets
traditionally funded with money market borrowing.
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[2] The shadow banking sector borrows in the money markets so there is no issue
of denomination intermediation.
[3] The shadow banking sector does not have risk intermediation. Instead, it
engages in risk reduction by investing in a portfolio of assets, but as with MMFs
and banks, the diversification is only through investing in a range of different
securities. Additionally, the portfolios have third party credit support through
credit ratings and liquidity guarantees and,
[4] The shadow banking sector provides maturity intermediation. However, the
maturity mismatch creates liquidity risk (which became apparent during the
financial crisis). That is, the shadow banking sector relies on its ability to roll its
money market borrowings.
The financial crisis occurred when money market investors (i.e., MMFs and their
shareholders) became concerned about the value and liquidity of their portfolios should
the counterparty credit support fail.
The largest cash providers in this market are MMFs (25%-33%) and securities
dealers (25%) that seek short-term investments for their temporarily available cash
(Copeland et al, 2010). Agapova (2011) suggests that mutual fund families and their
investors use MMFs as cash centers. The growth in MMFs provided a substantial portion
of the cash that funded the shadow banking sector. There were also over 4,000 individual
firms active as cash investors. We have access to the data on the portfolio composition of
asset-backed commercial paper programs and find that the major asset categories include:
securities (such as mortgage-backed securities), commercial loans, credit card and trade
receivables, student loans, and auto loans. Other than trade receivables, these asset
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categories are not the types traditionally funded by money market lenders as they do not
have the short maturities required to repay the money market lenders.
The shadow banking sector evolved as a result of increased competition from
non-banks, principally the money market mutual funds, decreased regulation and the
innovation of financial instruments.

In the early 1980’s interest rate ceilings were

eliminated and banks were allowed to conduct business in a number of different financial
activities. Derivatives and the concomitant need for collateral became more important;
loans became more liquid and could be sold into the secondary market, but most
importantly, securitization allowed portfolios of loans to be sold into the capital markets.
Securitization is a form of off-balance sheet banking in which bank loans are sold
to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), a legal entity which finances the purchase of the
portfolio by issuing investment grade securities to the capital markets, including money
market securities. The SPV is robotic in that it is essentially a ‘shell’ corporation; no one
works there and there is no physical location. Servicing the loans is outsourced and the
cash flow from the loans is allocated to the different investment tranches according to
pre-specified rules (see Figure 1). Importantly, SPVs are bankruptcy remote, meaning
that the failure of the originator of the loans is not relevant to the investors in the
securitized bonds. That is, in the event of bankruptcy, the originator of the loans cannot
reclaim the assets now in the SPV. Also, the SPV itself cannot go bankrupt. If the cash
flow from the loan portfolio that constitutes the assets of the SPV is insufficient for
making payments, then early amortization is triggered. We reproduce below a typical
schematic of the securitization process:
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Figure 1:

The Securitization Process

Tranching of Assets

AAA senior tranche

Pooling of Assets

AA tranche
Cash flow from Assets
SPV
holds
asset
pool

Originating
firm
creates
assets
Proceeds from sale
of Assets

A tranche

Investors

BBB tranche

Bottom (equity)
tranche retained
by originator

Note that the riskiest portion of the asset pool, the equity tranche, is generally retained as
a mark-to-market investment on the balance sheet of the originator, usually a large
investment or commercial bank. However, in mid-2000s originators often were able to
sell even the equity tranches to investors, and thus faced little risk. Gorton and Metrick
(2010) report that according to Federal Reserve Flow of Funds data, the ratio of offbalance-sheet funding to on-balance-sheet loan funding grew from zero in 1980 to over
60 percent in 2007.
Why did this type of financing vehicle become so popular? In addition to the
arguments made above about the need for collateral, there also existed an opportunity for
regulatory and ratings arbitrage. Brunnermeier (2009, p.80) points out:
“The Basel I accord (an international agreement that sets guidelines for bank
regulation) required that banks hold at least 8 percent of the loans on their
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balance sheets; this capital requirement. . .was much lower for contractual credit
lines. Moreover, there was no capital charge at all for “reputational” credit
lines – noncontractual liquidity backstops that sponsoring banks provided to
structured investment vehicles… Thus, moving a pool of loans into off-balancesheet vehicles, and then granting a credit line to that pool to ensure a AAA-rating,
allowed banks to reduce the amount of capital they needed to hold. . . while the
risk for the bank remained essentially unchanged.”

According to Acharya et al. (2010), the SPV sponsors also provided four different
types of guarantees (all of which reduced bank capital requirements) which provided
different levels of insurance to outside investors. The results of their analyses suggest:
[1] during the first year of the crisis, asset-backed commercial paper issuance and
maturity fell and spreads increased especially for SPVs with weaker guarantees, riskier
banks and lower quality assets, [2] banks with more exposure to SPVs had lower stock
returns and [3] losses from the SPVs remained with the banks rather than outside
investors. That is, as the guarantees were called to make the outside investors whole, the
losses were taken on the banks’ balance sheets and massive deleveraging (see section
III.C) took place with the ensuing downward pressure on asset prices.
We define the vehicles and conduits more extensively in Section III.B. For the
present, it is important to understand why this shadow system must be recognized as part
of the total banking system. Securitization through the use of off-balance sheet special
investment vehicles (SIVs) and SPVs involves the issuance of bonds that can be used
extensively as collateral in sale and repurchase agreements (repos) which are discussed
more extensively in Section III.C, freeing other categories of assets, mostly treasuries, for
use as collateral in derivative transactions and for use in settlement systems. Repos
therefore are a form of “deposit” of short-term money backed by highly rated collateral
just as deposits are backed by FDIC guarantees. Gorton (2009b) states that by March 4,
12

2008 primary dealers reported financing $4.5 trillion in fixed income securities with
repos.7

III.

Money Markets
The traditional money market instruments are: Treasury bills (T-bills), short-term

agency debt, commercial paper (CP), repurchase agreements (repos), federal (fed) funds,
negotiable certificates of deposits (CD) and bankers’ acceptances (BA). In this paper, we
discuss only T-bills, CP, repos, and fed funds. Short-term agency debt and negotiable
CDs are excluded because these markets were not major factors in the financial crisis.
BAs are excluded because their use has declined to the point where it is not an
economically important market given the amount of trading in the other money market
instruments.8 We also include a discussion of bank interactions with the money markets
and Federal Reserve policy actions because each plays an important role in the financial
crisis.

A. T-bills
As previously stated, money market lenders require short-term debt contracts with
low-default risk borrowers and with a liquid secondary market should they need to sell
prematurely. US Treasury bills (T-bills) have initial maturities of one year or less with
no default risk and a liquid secondary market. Because of these characteristics, T-bills
are often referred to as the ideal money market security. The flip side of this coin is that
all other money market securities are less than ideal because the others have either more
default risk than T-bills, less liquidity than T-bills or both.

13

When there is a crisis of confidence, i.e., concerns about increased default risk or
concerns about the true value of otherwise highly rated collateral, investors often move to
less risky securities in what is described as ‘a flight to quality.’ Treasury securities have
the ultimate quality under such conditions and such flights increase the demand for Tbills, increasing their prices and decreasing yields. To demonstrate this point, we provide
in Table 1 the T-bill auction results from September 2007 (the beginning of the crisis)
and September 2008 (one year into the crisis).
Table 1

Date
9-4-07
9-4-07
9-4-07
9-13-07
9-13-07
9-13-07
9-13-07
9-20-07
9-20-07
9-20-07
9-27-07
9-27-07
9-27-07

September 2007
Maturity
26-week
13-week
4-week
26-week
13-week
4-week
4-day
26-week
13-week
4-week
26-week
13-week
4-week

Yield
4.380%
4.350
4.280
4.020
3.800
4.000
4.620
4.130
4.050
3.930
4.000
3.820
3.270

Date
9-4-08
9-4-08
9-4-08
9-4-08
9-11-08
9-11-08
9-11-08
9-18-08
9-18-08
9-18-08
9-18-08
9-19-08
9-19-08
9-22-08
9-22-08
9-25-08
9-25-08
9-25-08
9-25-08
9-25-08
9-26-08
9-29-08

September 2008
Maturity
26-week
13-week
4-week
6-day
26-week
13-week
4-week
26-week
13-week
4-week
35-day
76-day
20-day
59-day
45-day
52-week
26-week
13-week
4-week
7-day
34-day
101-day

Yield
1.890%
1.685
1.540
2.000
1.900
1.690
1.575
1.550
1.050
0.300
0.300
0.254
0.100
1.990
1.800
1.955
1.790
1.420
0.350
0.050
0.990
1.650

Under pre-crisis Treasury auction rules, the regular weekly T-bill auction covered
4-week, 13-week and 26-week T-bills. Any T-bills with different maturities are cash
management bills which are issued through off-cycle auctions to cover unusual needs as
14

determined by the Department of the Treasury. A then typical year averaged one or two
cash management bill issues per month. The data in the table for September 2007
represent a typical month with regular weekly auctions of 4-week, 13-week and 26-week
T-bills and one cash management auction, the 4-day bill issued on September 13. The
yields in September 2007 are also fairly typical for pre-crisis T-bills. September 2008,
however, is not. There are nine cash management auctions and, there is an auction for a
52-week T-bill. Historically, the Treasury had regular auctions in 52-week bills, but
these were discontinued in February 2001.9 Also, the yields are very low. In fact, on the
7-day bill on 9-25-08 the yield is only 5 basis points which, over 7 days represents $0.01
of interest per $1,000 invested (note, the target fed funds rate is 2.0% for overnight funds
at this time). A round lot in the Treasury bill market is $5 million, meaning it would earn
$50 of interest. The data from September 2008 are consistent with a flight to quality.
All of the yields from September 2008 are less than any estimate of expected
inflation at the time implying that investors in these bills are expecting negative real
returns. Normally, one might consider buying an investment with an expected negative
real return to be irrational. However, during a crisis of confidence investors put the
preservation of principal ahead of all other concerns.
One immediate response to the previous statement could be that money market
investors should put their funds in insured bank deposits.

However, there are two

problems with this argument; [1] the FDIC insurance limit was $100,000 while a round
lot for T-bills in institutional trading is $5,000,000, hence deposit insurance does not
cover the typical transaction size10 and, [2] even when a deposit is insured, there can be
delays when a bank becomes insolvent, which would prevent access to the funds when
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needed. Since money market investments are designed to fit specific cash obligations,
any delay is unacceptable. One way to view the low September 2008 yields is that
investors are buying a form of deposit insurance from the US government. That is,
money market investors are lending their money to the US government at such low rates
to ensure that their funds are returned to them in full at the contracted time.
However, the low yields in September 2008 also reflect actions by the Federal
Reserve to increase liquidity in the market. As such, these yields cannot be viewed in
isolation and it is important to examine the risk in the economic context. In this market,
this is usually done through an examination of the TED spread, the difference between an
unsecured one-month Eurodollar deposit and the four-week Treasury bill. We present
these data in Figure 2.
As shown, in September 2007, with the first few rumblings of the crisis becoming
known, the TED spread was generally less than 200 basis points, which is generally
indicative of minimal concerns about the price of risk. In early September 2008, after
several Federal Reserve actions to inject liquidity, concerns had calmed to the point
where the spread hovered around 100 basis points.

With the Lehman Brothers

bankruptcy however, confidence in the market in general and in financial institutions in
particular fell to the point where the TED spread peaked at 574 basis points, considerably
higher than in September 2007.
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Figure 2
TED Spread: September 2007 & September 2008
Spread of 1-Month Eurodollar Deposits over 4-week T-bill
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B. Commercial Paper
Commercial paper (CP), like T-bills, is a discount instrument but was traditionally
the unsecured short-term debt of private corporations with maturities of between one and
270 days. Throughout the 2000s, there were between 1,000 and 2,000 issuers with a total
volume of outstandings well in excess of $1 trillion. Importantly, CP issuers who are
generally large and have very high credit quality, are not homogeneous. One distinction
is between non-financial CP and financial CP (issued by financial institutions, primarily
bank-holding companies and finance companies).

A second distinction is based on
17

credit risk and is identified through a credit rating system. More than 95% of all issuers
are in the top two CP rating categories, A1/P1 and A2/P2.
Because the intermediary is bypassed, commercial paper is a cheaper source of
short-term funding for corporations than bank loans. Non-financial CP issues (less than
15% of the market) are usually backed by bank lines of credit, which covers rollover risk
but not default risk. That is, issuers frequently roll over CP instead of retiring it by having
the new CP repay the maturing CP and thus, on occasion, creating a timing problem. The
back-up lines of credit exist to eliminate this rollover risk by providing immediate access
to liquidity when such timing problems occur. However, a bank can refuse to extend a
loan in the case of a material adverse change in the borrower’s financial condition which
can be invoked in instances where the issuer’s credit rating may have or is changing.
Note that when a bank honors the back-up line of credit, it will directly affect its balance
sheet.
Historically, most commercial paper has been unsecured, backed only by a firm’s
ability to generate cash flows. With the advent of securitization and asset-backed
securities, asset-backed CP (ABCP) has become a significant part of the CP market and
an important funding source for the shadow banking sector. An institution issuing ABCP
sells its assets to a bankruptcy-remote SPV or SIV. The financial assets serving as
collateral may be accounts receivable or a mix of many different assets (including or
limited to subprime mortgages), which are jointly judged to have a low risk of payment
default by a ratings agency. See Figure 3 for the mechanics of ABCP. In 2007-2008,
many of these assets performed more poorly than expected, making investors much less
willing to purchase ABCP.11 As markets became unwilling to purchase ABCP because of
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valuation issues, cash flow issues arose for institution relying on rolling over their ABCP
to finance longer-term investments.

Figure 3
Mechanics of Issuing Asset Backed Commercial Paper

Holding
Company
Sale of
Receivable

100%
Ownership
Finance
Agreement

Seller
Or
Affiliated
Companies

Purchaser
SPVs

Issuer

Credit
enhancement/
Liquidity lines

Arranger

Commercial
Paper

Investors

Recall that ABCP conduits such as SIVs and SPVs are operating entities that
purchase long-term asset-backed securities and finance them with short-term debt,
principally commercial paper. Carey et al. (2009) report that prior to the crisis, ABCP
conduits held approximately $1.4 trillion in total assets most of which were sponsored by
banks. Covitz et al. (2009, p.7) report that “more than half of ABCP daily issuance has
maturities of 1 to 4 days [referred to as overnight], and the average maturity of
outstanding paper is about 30 days.” SIVs set up by some commercial banks had been
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very profitable when ABCP was considered safe (so that ABCP investors accepted a low
interest rate), but forced SIVs to quickly liquidate their longer-term investments,
sometimes at substantial losses, when they were no longer able to sell ABCP.12
An often repeated comment in the media was that the CP market ‘froze’ at the
beginning of the financial crisis with no borrower able to access the CP market.13 Figure
4 provides outstanding CP amounts in all maturities of total, non-financial, financial, and
asset-backed CP, and provides a number of important insights:14
[1] non-financial CP, the traditional category of unsecured corporate debt, is
relatively stable across the financial crisis, although there is a small downturn
following the Lehman bankruptcy. The relatively stable amount outstanding in
non-financial CP indicates that contrary to popular belief, this segment of the
market continued to function.
[2] The CP market peaked at about $2.2 trillion outstanding just prior to the BNP
announcement and declined steadily to a little over $1 trillion. The CP market
contracted, basically returning to the pre-housing bubble levels of about $1.3
trillion in January of 2004.
[3] The vast majority of the contraction in the CP market occurred in ABCP
which peaked at $1.2 trillion in June of 2007 just prior to the BNP announcement
and declined to about $400 billion.
[4] Financial CP peaked at about $800 billion before the Lehman bankruptcy only
to decline to about $500 billion as lenders became concerned about the stability of
the entire financial system, again returning this segment to pre-housing bubble
amounts outstanding.
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The point of Figure 4 is that all of the CP market did not freeze. Instead, specific
segments with specific risks declined.15

$ trln.

Figure 4
Amounts of Commercial Paper Outstanding January 2004 – September 2010
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After the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, a large
institutional MMF, Reserve Primary, “broke the buck.” That is, it had a negative return
on investment, due to its holdings of $785 million of the Lehman-issued commercial
paper. This was only the second occurrence of breaking the buck in the 35-year history of
the money market fund industry.16 The event caused something of a panic among
institutional money fund investors who started making large withdrawals, causing money
funds to liquidate some assets quickly.
Historically, the development of money market funds and the commercial paper
market have gone hand in hand: MMFs bought CP in search of superior returns on
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relatively safe assets, and firms were encouraged to issue CP because MMFs were willing
to buy it. Brennan et al. (2009) report that money market mutual funds managed 24
percent of US business short-term assets in 2006. While all money market securities are
fairly liquid, CP is one of the least liquid classes of securities held by MMFs, and the one
considered riskiest by investors after the Lehman fall. Consequently, MMFs started
avoiding CP, especially the asset-backed, financial, and lower-rated non-financial
segments, and switched instead to safe heavens such as U.S. T-bills, driving the demand
for commercial paper down and yields up.17 Brennan et al. (2009) report that MMFs
faced with the potential of breaking the buck on investments created a ‘run’ on conduits
and SIVs forcing the latter to sell assets at ‘fire-sale’ prices. This flight to quality
involved investors who moved assets out of MMFs that invested mainly in private sector
debt into those that invested primarily in US Treasury debt. From September through
December 2008, Brennan et al. report the private sector debt MMFs suffered a net cash
outflow of $234 billion and the US Treasury MMFs received a net inflow of $489 billion.
The Federal Reserve started operating the Asset Backed Commercial Paper
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) on September 22, 2008, which
financed purchases of CP by banks and other institutions from MMFs. The Department of
the Treasury, in turn, announced it would insure MMFs from breaking the buck. This
measure stopped the wave of withdrawals from MMFs. The Federal Reserve created the
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) that became operational on October 27, 2008
and purchased A1/P1 rated CP from issuers at the overnight index swap (OIS) rate plus
200 bps.18 Asset-backed CP was purchased at the OIS plus 300 bps.

22

Financial CP rates increased following the Lehman failure and remained high
until the implementation of the CPFF. At this point, AA-rated financial CP rates dropped
below the rate charged by CPFF. The CPFF program held approximately 15% and 25%
of the CP outstanding in November and December of 2008 (see Figure 5 in Kaperczky
and Schnabl (2010)), and those paying the CPFF rate would be the higher-risk borrowers
within each class. A2/P2 rated CP was not eligible for CPFF purchases and, as a result,
the yields of A2/P2 CP remained very high through the end of year 2008.
There are a couple of important points to reiterate here. First, the CP market is
not homogeneous. Second, the CP market did not stop functioning. It continued to
function properly, but saw dramatic declines in specific segments because of specific
risks. Finally, the CP market responded to the financial crisis in a manner consistent with
its economic role. That is, money market investors declined to lend when they were
concerned about getting their funds back on time and in full.
C. Repurchase agreements and their role in the total banking sector
A repurchase agreement (also known as a repo or sale and repurchase agreement)
allows a borrower to use a financial security as collateral for a cash loan at a fixed rate
of interest. The borrower agrees to sell a security to a lender and also agrees to buy the
same security back from the lender at a specified price at a later date. Thus, a repo is
equivalent to a cash transaction combined with a forward contract (see Figure 5). The
cash transaction results in funds transferred to the borrower in exchange for the legal
transfer of the security to the lender (which is generally held by a trustee), while the
forward contract ensures repayment of the loan to the lender and the return of the
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collateral. The difference between the forward price and the spot price is the interest on
the loan and the settlement date of the forward contract is the maturity date of the loan.
Economically, a repo is a secured loan, with the buyer (the lender) receiving
securities as collateral to protect against default of the seller (the borrower). Almost any
security may be employed in a repo, although highly liquid securities (especially T-bills
and GSE debt) are preferred as they can easily be liquidated in the case of default.
Unlike in a secured loan, legal title to the securities clearly passes from the seller to the
buyer.

Figure 5: Repurchase Mechanics
Stage 1 can be viewed as the collateralized borrowing or ‘sale’;
Stage 2 reverses the transaction and delivers repo interest

Borrower
of
money
i.e.,
Supplier
(seller)
of
collateral

Repo:
Stage 1
Money
Loaned
Securities
Repo:
Stage 2
Money Loaned + repo
interest due
Securities

Borrower
(Buyer)
of
collateral
i.e.,
Lender
of
money

Adapted from Stigum & Crescenzi (2007)

There are three types of repo maturities: overnight, term, and open. Overnight
refers to a one-day maturity transaction. A term repo has a specified end date (longer than
one day). Open repos simply have no end date – they are made on a rolling day-to-day
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basis with no final maturity; both the lender and the borrower have the right to immediate
termination. While repos are typically short-term, pre-crisis it was not unusual to see
repos with a maturity as long as two years.
Repos occur in three forms: specified delivery, tri-party, and held in custody. The
first form, specified delivery, requires the delivery of a pre-specified bond at the onset
and at maturity. Tri-party is a basket form of transaction which allows for a wider range
of instruments in the basket or pool and utilizes a clearing agent or bank making them a
more efficient form of repo transaction. The third form is rare in developing markets
primarily due to risk of having the lender of the funds declare insolvency while holding
the borrower’s securities. Regaining the securities in such cases can be a long and
difficult legal process.
Because the value of the collateral may fall, repos are over-collateralized through
a mechanism known as a haircut. For example, a 2% haircut results in the seller
(borrower) receiving 98% of the market value of the securities from the buyer and the
interest is calculated on this latter amount. Below we reproduce Table 4 from
Krishnamurthy (2010) in which he reports changes in repo haircuts from the Spring of
2007 through the Spring of 2009.
Table 2
Repo haircuts (%)
Spring Spring Fall Spring
2007
2008
2008 2009
US Treasuries (short-term)
2
2
2
2
US Treasuries (long-term)
5
5
6
6
Agency mortgage backed securities
2.5
6
8.5
6.5
Corporate bonds, A-/A3 or above
5
10
20
20
Collateralized mortgage obligations, AAA
10
30
40
40
Asset-backed securities, AA/Aa2 and above
10
25
30
35
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The Federal Reserve engages in repos by buying Treasury, agency, or mortgagebacked securities from primary dealers who agree to buy them back, typically within one
to seven days; in a reverse repo, the Fed sells securities and repurchases them later.19
Both repos and reverses are considered open market operations (OMO) with interest rates
determined via auction. In a repo, primary dealers bid on borrowing money based on
various types of general collateral. In a reverse repo, dealers offer interest rates at which
they would lend money to the Fed.20 During the crisis, the Fed expanded the nature of the
collateral acceptable for open market operations, effectively changing the market’s
standards.
Repos in which the lender agrees to accept any security of a given class (e.g., U.S.
Treasury or GSE debt) as collateral are general repos. In a special repo, the lender
requires a specific security as collateral. Thus, special repos are basically a mechanism
for borrowing specific securities. A particular Treasury issue may “go on special” when
there are large short positions which may result from underwriters who want to hedge
their inventory of corporate debt securities. It is not uncommon to observe special repo
rates significantly below general collateral rates.21
The repo market had two principal roles in the financial crisis: (1) funding of
traditional bank assets and investment bank inventory and (2) Federal Reserve
temporary open market operations. The latter are discussed elsewhere in this paper, so
we focus here on the investment banks’ use of repos.
Blackwell, Griffiths and Winters (2007, chapter 2) provide the following
aggregate balance sheet (Figure 6) for securities firms.
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Figure 6
Securities Companies Assets and Liabilities
(as a percentage of total assets)

It is clear that repos are the largest source of funds for securities firms and are a
major asset class as reverses, used to acquire securities for sale. The repo market is also
one of the largest segments of the money markets, with $3.3 trillion outstanding at the
end of April 2006 (Stigum and Crescenzi, 2007). Tri-party repos, the most common
form used by securities firms, peaked at $2.8 trillion in early 2008, but declined to $1.7
trillion by the first quarter of 2010. At the peak of the market, the largest dealer
positions exceeded $400 billion.22

According to the Report of the Money Market

Working Group (2009) in December 2008, MMFs alone held $552 billion in (reverse)
repurchase agreements.
As the financial crisis unfolded, concerns about all securities firms’ financial
conditions mounted to the point where Bears Stern became illiquid. At this point, lenders
27

were concerned about the ability to be repaid and, in the case of default, the ability to
liquidate collateral (especially risky collateral) in a timely and orderly manner.23 With
these heightened concerns over risky collateral, the repo market saw a form of flight to
quality as it moved increasingly toward demanding T-bills as collateral. This made Tbills scarce and lead to a significant increase in the number of Treasury settlement fails.24
As a result, it became increasingly difficult for securities firms to continue to operate in
their usual manner. Hordahl and King (2008) note that as the crisis progressed, the rate
on US government-backed repos declined relative to the OIS rate for a comparable
maturity, while the rate on riskier collateral rose relative to the appropriate OIS rate
benchmark.
Returning to Table 2, we see that as the crisis unfolded, the size of the haircuts
grew. Thus, the value of the risky assets on banks’ balance sheets became increasingly
questionable and unavailable for use in the raising of funds. In the Spring of 2007,
collateralized mortgage obligations worth $100 million dollars could be used to raise $90
million in cash. By Spring 2009, this same amount of collateralized mortgage obligations
would raise only $60 million. This is equivalent to bank creditors withdrawing $30
million in deposits. Hence, banks would have to sell additional securities to raise funds,
which drive the asset values lower, thereby reinforcing the cycle: lower prices, less
collateral, more concerns about solvency and increasing haircuts. Gorton and Metrick
(2011) report that several classes of assets stopped entirely from being used as collateral.
This was an unprecedented event that is equivalent to a haircut of 100%. With haircuts
increasing, the financial system either had to shrink or banks had to find additional
capital in the form of external equity injections (which several firms, including Citigroup,
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Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley did, during the fall of 2007).25 Unfortunately, these
sources dried up quickly as the financial crisis progressed.
Uncertain about the solvency of counterparties, repo depositors became concerned
that the collateral might not be liquid; if all firms wanted to hold cash – a flight to quality
– then collateral would have to decline in price to find buyers. This in turn gave rise to a
serious liquidity concern in that institutions began to believe that there was no private
agent or entity large enough to buy sufficient assets to solve the problem. Left with the
only alternative of selling assets, the outcome was that prices had to fall and losses had to
be realized.
To demonstrate the full impact of this issue, we now provide an example of
levering and de-levering of a bank’s balance sheet under mark-to-market accounting as
asset prices change and include in this example the role of the repo market.
When balance sheets are marked-to-market, changes in asset prices show up
immediately on balance sheets and have an immediate effect on the net worth of all
members of the financial system. The net worth of traditional banks and investment
banks is particularly sensitive to fluctuations in asset prices given the highly leveraged
nature of (virtually all) banks’ balance sheets.
Consider some basic arithmetic related to the balance sheet of investment banks.
Suppose a bank with 10% equity holds $50 million in Treasuries and cash and $50
million in risky mortgage securities. The initial balance sheet would look like:
Assets

Liabilities

Treasuries & cash =50

Debt = 90

Risky securities

=50 Equity =10
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Assume that the assets are marked to market and that the value of debt stays
roughly constant at 90 for small shifts in the value of total assets. Hence, total leverage
is: Leverage = Assets/(Assets-Debt) = 100/(100-90)=10. Suppose now that the value of
the risky securities increases to $51 million.
Assets

Liabilities

Treasuries & cash =50

Debt

Risky securities

=90

=51 Equity =11

As a consequence, leverage will fall to 101/11=9.18. If the investment bank
continues to target a leverage ratio of 10, then it must take on additional debt (D) to
purchase D dollars worth of securities. That is, assets/equity = (101+D)/11=10 meaning
D=9. How does the bank do this? Primarily, through the acquisition of short term debt,
most notably repurchase (repo) agreements. Thus:
Assets

Liabilities

Treasuries & cash

=50 Debt

Risky securities

=60

=90

ST Repo = 9
Equity

=11

Although the bank could purchase additional Treasuries, a profit maximizing
bank would benefit more by purchasing assets with higher yields. This mechanism works
in reverse also. Suppose that there is a shock to securities’ prices such that the value of
the holdings falls to $109 million. On the liability side, the equity falls by $1 million
since the value of the debt remains approximately constant.
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Assets

Liabilities

Treasuries & cash

=50 Debt

Risky securities

=59

=90

ST Repo = 9
Equity

=10

However, the leverage is now too high and, in order to maintain the leverage ratio
of 10 times, the bank can adjust its leverage by selling securities originally worth 10 and
paying down the short term repo of $9 million, returning the balance sheet to its initial
position. As Adrian and Shin (2008) point out, the significance is that bank leverage is
pro-cyclical and, in particular, they report that repo growth explains 43% of the variation
in leverage growth. This means that increases in securities’ prices lead to purchases of
additional (often risky) securities and increases in leverage while decreases in securities’
prices lead to sales of securities and decreases in leverage. When securities prices go up,
the upward adjustment of leverage entails purchases of securities that are even larger than
that for the case of constant leverage. If there is the possibility for positive feedback,
then the adjustment of leverage and price changes reinforces each other in an
amplification of the financial cycle.
Finally, to conclude our discussion on repos, we must mention the misuse of
repos by Lehman Brothers. In a series of seemingly innocuous transactions, repos were
used by Lehman Brothers to mislead investors in several quarters prior to its bankruptcy
filing.26 Lehman employed so-called (within Lehman) “Repo 105” and “Repo 108”
transactions to temporarily remove securities inventory from the balance sheet in late
2007 and 2008.27 Repo 105s were similar to standard repos with the critical difference
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that Lehman accounted for Repo 105 transactions as “sales” rather than as financing
transactions based upon the overcollateralization or higher than normal haircut in such
transactions.
Lehman then used 105 and 108 repos to report lower balance sheet leverage. By
classifying these transactions as sales, Lehman removed the inventory from its balance
sheet in the days just prior to reporting dates. The cash was then used to pay down other
liabilities, thereby reducing both the total liabilities and the total assets reported on its
balance sheet and lowering its leverage ratios. A few days after the reporting date,
Lehman would borrow the necessary funds to repay the cash borrowing plus interest due,
repurchase the securities, and restore the assets to its balance sheet. Lehman did not
publicly disclose its use of Repo 105s, its accounting treatment for these transactions, the
increase in Repo 105 usage in late 2007 and 2008, or the impact on the publicly reported
net leverage ratio.28

D. Federal (Fed) funds
The Monetary Control Act of 1980 requires that depository institutions in the US
keep a percentage of their deposits on reserve at the Federal Reserve. The percentage of
deposits held in reserve and how these reserves are reviewed for compliance purposes are
defined in Regulation D (Reg D) of the Code of Federal Regulations.

Depository

institutions subject to Reg D trade reserve deposits in the federal (fed) funds market to
manage their reserve positions for compliance purposes. Because fed funds trading
involves reserve deposits used for compliance with Reg D, depository institutions are
very default-risk averse in this market.29
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There are many Reg D details that are important to depository institutions and to
understanding the operations of this market however, access to the fed funds market is
limited to traders with reserve deposits, which keeps many money market traders from
participating in this market. The result is that understanding fed funds trading is not
central to understanding the role of this money market in the financial crisis.
Accordingly, we will not detail the operations of the fed funds market here and instead
refer the readers to Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988), Griffiths and Winters (1995), Cyree,
Griffiths and Winters (2003) and Clouse and Dow (2002) for the details. This section
continues with the actions of banks and Federal Reserve during the financial crisis that
relate to the fed funds market.
Because fed funds are the most liquid assets in the financial system, the fed funds
rate is sensitive to changes in the money supply. Since 1982, the Fed has conducted
monetary policy by setting a target fed funds rate (TFFR) at a particular level and then
ensuring that the actual (market-determined) fed funds rates are close to the target. The
approximation of the actual fed funds rates is the effective federal funds rate series
(EFFR); it is a weighted average of the rates on brokered trades reported to the Federal
Reserve by the federal funds brokers. While small and/or temporary deviations of the
effective rate from the target rate are of little concern for the Fed, if the EFFR is
significantly higher (lower) than the TFFR, the Fed would act by increasing (decreasing)
money supply, usually through the use of purchases (sales) of government or agency
securities from primary dealers (open market operations).30
Reserves above the Reg D requirement are known as excess reserves. During the
first six months of 2008, total depository institutions’ reserves ran at about $43 billion
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with excess reserves at around $2 billion (see Figure 7). For the two-week period ending
October 8, 2008 estimated total reserves were $179 billion with excess reserves of $136
billion.
Why would depository institutions hold such high levels of excess reserves? One
answer is that when the money markets are not functioning properly, the only way for
banks to ensure that they have enough cash to cover customer withdrawal demands
(liquidity risk) is to hold more cash, and it is much less costly to hold substantial excess
reserves than to risk not being able to meet withdrawal demands.

Figure 7
Excess Reserves of Depository Institutions
(Federal Reserve Statistical Release H 3)
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Afonso et al. (2009) in a study of the federal funds market around the Lehman
bankruptcy determine that banks became more restrictive in terms of which
counterparties they loaned to in this market. They found that while the market did not
contract dramatically, lending rates did increase. After the Lehman collapse, the fed
funds market became sensitive to bank specific characteristics, not only in the amounts
loaned to borrowers but even in the cost of capital.

Large banks showed reduced

amounts of daily borrowing and borrowed from fewer counterparties. Smaller banks
increased the amount borrowed and added lending counterparties during the crisis.
On October 6, 2008, the Fed announced that it would start paying interest on
required and excess reserve balances.31 The rate on required balances was set equal to the
target fed funds rate set by the Fed minus 10 basis points (0.1%), and the rate on excess
reserves was set at 75 basis points below the TFFR. Thus, holding excess reserves would
still involve an opportunity cost (assuming that the actual Fed funds rate is close to the
TFFR). However, in mid-December 2008, the Fed reduced the TFFR to between 0 and
0.25% and set the interest rate on both required and excess balances at 0.25%. At the time
of this writing (July 2011), this is still the case. Because banks earn as much, if not more,
by holding excess reserves than they would by lending to other banks in the fed funds
market, they are effectively discouraged from lending and encouraged to hold excess
reserves. For the week ended October 27, 2010, the total depository institutions reserves
stood at just over $1trillion. The overwhelming majority of this amount (at least 90%) is
excess reserves. This is representative of most of 2009 and 2010. While it is not clear
whether depositories would be holding as much in excess reserves if they did not earn
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interest on these balances, the financial crisis made many institutions much more cautious
and conservative in their lending decisions.32
As banks became more conservative during the crisis, they held increasing
amounts of excess reserves because they had funded illiquid loans with highly liquid
deposits. Typically, banks manage liquidity (1) by holding enough cash for a few days of
normal withdrawals, (2) by storing cash in liquid money market securities, and (3) by
having access to borrowed liquidity in the money markets (such as the fed funds market).
In the current crisis, borrowing funds in the money markets became more difficult. In
addition, with money market trading slowing down, banks could not rely on retrieving
the liquidity stored in money market securities on short notice. Thus holding cash
became, by far, the most reliable source of liquidity which they funded with excess
reserves.
Banks typically use deposited cash to make loans that generate profits. While
profits are a long-term goal of all businesses, in the case of banks, the short-term goal of
meeting withdrawal demands dominates. Without properly functioning money markets,
banks will increase their cash holdings to ensure survival, making it more difficult for
individuals and businesses to get the loans they need.
Figures 8 and 9 provide data on the bank balance sheets, and we divide the
discussion into before and after the Lehman bankruptcy.
The period before the Lehman bankruptcy includes the beginning of the crisis
where banks operated as usual. The total assets of domestically chartered US banks
increased steadily until the Lehman bankruptcy with the asset growth prior to the
financial crisis being driven by the (housing) loan growth.

Through the first three
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quarters of 2006 deposit growth was able to fund this growth, but from that point through
the Lehman bankruptcy deposit growth lagged. Banks covered the difference through
short-term (i.e., money market) borrowings.
After the Lehman bankruptcy there is a very different view of the banks’ balance
sheet. First, total assets spike and then decline somewhat. The decline in total assets is
mirrored by declines in loans and borrowings. Thus, as loans decline banks can repay the
borrowings that funded the pre-Lehman loan growth. We note that it has been popular in
the press to say that banks are “not lending” post-Lehman. Bank loan portfolios include
short-term loans and loans with regular repayment schedules, so that without new loans
the amount of loans would decline rapidly. The loan plot in Figure 8 suggests a decline
post Lehman consistent with an increase in credit standards, followed by an increase in
loans at the beginning of 2010.

This suggests that banks continue to make loans,

although with perhaps substantially higher credit standards. Finally, Figure 9, which
plots three out of the six series from Figure 8, shows a combined increase in cash and
securities of about $1 trillion, as well as a decrease in borrowing of about $0.5 trillion
post-Lehman. Banks typically hold about 5 times as many assets in money market
securities as in cash, but the post-Lehman increase leans toward cash. This suggests that
banks were concerned, in part, about how well the money markets were functioning.
The $1 trillion increase in cash and money market securities mirrors the $1 trillion
increase in excess reserves seen in Figure 7.
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Figure 8
Aggregate Balance Sheet Items
From Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks
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Figure 9
Aggregate Balance Sheet Items
From Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks

$ trln.

2.5

LEHMAN
2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

Securities

Cash

Sep-10

May-10

Jan-10

Sep-09

May-09

Jan-09

Sep-08

May-08

Jan-08

Sep-07

May-07

Jan-07

Sep-06

May-06

Jan-06

Sep-05

May-05

Jan-05

Sep-04

May-04

Jan-04

0.0

Borrowings

To reinforce the points made earlier on the lack of confidence in the lending
markets and the potential for higher credit standards, we summarize the findings of
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) below. Based upon their analysis of data from Reuters’
DealScan database of large bank loans, the authors glean the following facts:
•

New lending in 2008 was significantly below new lending in 2007 even
before Lehman failure.

•

The decline in new loans increased during the panic. The dollar volume in
2008:4 was 47% lower than in the previous quarter and the number of
issues was 33% lower.

•

The dollar volume of restructuring loans in 2008:4 (for M&A and share
repurchase purposes) was 84% below its peak and the dollar volume of
real investment was 72% below its peak. Respectively, these loans were
60% and 14% less than in the previous quarter.
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IV.

•

In 2008:4, investment grade lending was 77% lower and non-investment
grade lending was 91% lower than their peaks during the credit boom.
Respectively, they were 22% and 75% lower than in the previous quarter.

•

In 2008:4 new issues of credit-line facilities fell by 67% and term loans
fell by 27%.

The Fed and other Market Interventions: Pre- and Post-Lehman
The Fed is an active participant in the money markets during normal market

conditions and it increased its role during the financial crisis. This section discusses the
role the Fed and other government market interventions played in dealing with the
financial crisis and is divided into the pre- and post-Lehman periods because the types of
interventions changed dramatically following the Lehman bankruptcy.
The Federal Reserve was created by the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 to have four
broad powers: (1) to provide an elastic money supply, (2) to be a lender of last resort to
depository institutions, (3) to provide for a sound banking system and, (4) to improve the
payment system. The first three powers clearly give the Fed a role in managing the
current financial crisis with the first two relating directly to the money markets.
The Fed actively manages the money supply through open market operations
(OMO), the buying and selling of securities on the open market. Each business day at
approximately 9:30AM, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York announces whether it
will buy (add money), sell (drain money), or abstain from trading on that day. If the Fed
deems that the needed change in the money supply should be temporary in nature, it
trades assets via repurchase agreements (repos) and reverses instead of outright sales and
purchases of securities. Historically, the Fed traded T-bills in OMO.

However,

commencing in December 2007, the Fed has also traded agency debt and (most recently)
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mortgage-backed securities. Open market operations averaged about $10 billion per day
in 2006 and 2007.
The Fed’s lender of last resort power has traditionally operated through the
discount window which is designed for depositories to be able to borrow when they need
liquidity but cannot obtain it from the market. This has a negative connotation because
only ‘high-risk’ borrowers would not be able to borrow the needed liquidity from the
money markets under normal conditions, so banks generally avoid going to the discount
window. In addition, discount window borrowing requires the provision of collateral
while most money markets do not (the clear exception is the repo market). Concerns that
banks did not and would not access the discount window for needed liquidity led the Fed
to make some recent changes to its discount window policies.
Historically, access to the discount window was tightly constrained. Specifically,
use of the window was limited to depository institutions with very specific types of
collateral. To ensure adequate liquidity during the current crisis, the Fed has opened the
discount window to other types of financial institutions (e.g., AIG, Goldman Sachs, JP
Morgan) and has dramatically broadened the collateral acceptable for discount window
loans. The specifics of the changes to the discount window are beyond the scope of this
paper.33
The Fed has worked throughout the crisis to attempt to ensure adequate liquidity
in the market. However, the media frequently referred to the crisis as one of liquidity and
then complained that the Fed was not getting the markets to flow freely. At this point, it
should be clear that the crisis was not solely one of liquidity. It was also a credit crisis
and when such problems exist in the money markets, liquidity will stand on the sidelines
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until the lenders are confident in the credit quality of the borrowers, the value of the
underlying collateral, and/or their own financial condition.
In the late summer and early fall of 2007, the Fed took several significant steps to
provide more access to the discount window. The increased access and the acceptance of
a wider range of collateral were designed to make the Fed the liquidity provider that got
off the sidelines and lent to more firms that had difficulty borrowing in the money
markets.34
Between August 9, 2007, the date of the BNP Paribas announcement and the
September 15, 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing, the Federal Reserve Board
reduced the primary credit rate eight times from 6.25 percent to 2.25 percent. Over the
same period, the federal funds target rate was lowered from 5.25 percent to 2.0 percent. A
sampling of the other major actions follows:
•

August 10, 2007. The Fed announces that it “will provide reserves as
necessary…to promote trading in the federal funds market at rates close to the
target rate of 5.25 percent.

•

December 12, 2007. The Fed creates a Term Auction Facility (TAF) which
allocated credit to depositories that submitted bids specifying amounts needed and
rates that they were willing to pay. Every successful bidder would then pay the
same stop-out rate. This setup required depositories to compete with each other
for the funds and thus removed the stigma associated with borrowing from the
discount window. TAF became a popular source of liquidity, but the ultimate goal
was not achieved, as depositories hoarded the borrowed cash for the most part.

•

March 11, 2008. The Fed creates the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)
which loaned $200 billion of Treasury securities to institutions in exchange for
much less liquid collateral.

•

March 16, 2008. The Fed establishes the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)
to extend overnight credit to primary dealers against a broad range of investment
grade securities. The Fed reduces the primary credit rate, lowering the spread
between the primary credit rate and FOMC federal funds target rate to 25 basis
points and increases the maximum maturity of primary credit loans to 90 days.
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•

July 13, 2008. The U.S. Treasury Department temporarily increases the credit
lines of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and temporarily authorizes the Treasury to
purchase equity in either GSE if needed.

•

September 7, 2008. The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) places Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac in government conservatorship.35
Commencing with the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the Fed moved from a policy

of attempting to improve liquidity to become an active investor/lender.

The Fed

continued to take steps to ensure the availability of liquidity including continued
reductions in the target federal funds rate (to between 0 to 0.25 percent) and continuation
of actions under previously announced programs to ensure the expansion of credit terms
and the nature of acceptable collateral. The Treasury also became an active investor
when, on 21 different occasions between October 28, 2008 and March 27, 2009, the US
Treasury purchased approximately $250 billion in preferred stock from US banks in an
effort to reduce the leverage and liquidity crisis. A sampling of the major steps where the
Fed or the Treasury became investors in this period follows:
•

September 15, 2008. Lehman Brothers Holdings Incorporated files for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. Bank of America announces the purchase Merrill Lynch
& Co. for $50 billion.

•

September 16, 2008. The Fed authorizes the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(FRBNY) to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group (AIG).

•

September 19, 2008. The Fed creates the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). The Treasury Department
announced that it would insure MMFs from “breaking the buck.”

•

October 3, 2008. Congress passes and President Bush signs into law the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which establishes the $700
billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).

•

October 7, 2008. The Fed creates the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)
which provided liquidity directly to the issuers of eligible highly-rated unsecured
and asset-backed three-month CP. The CPFF bought both ABCP and unsecured
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CP totaling $738.3 billion, and peaked in mid-January 2009 at $350 billion, or
21.85% of all CP then outstanding.
•

October 8, 2008. The Fed authorizes the FRBNY to borrow up to $37.8 billion in
investment-grade, fixed-income securities from AIG in return for cash.

•

November 21, 2008. The U.S. Treasury Department announces that it will help
liquidate The Reserve Fund’s U.S. Government Fund and agrees to serve as a
buyer of last resort for the fund’s securities to ensure the orderly liquidation of the
fund.

•

November 23, 2008. Citigroup will issue preferred shares to the Treasury and
FDIC in exchange for protection against losses on a $306 billion pool of
commercial and residential securities held by Citigroup. The Treasury will invest
an additional $20 billion in Citigroup from the TARP.

•

November 25, 2008. The Fed creates the Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending
Facility (TALF) to lend up to $200 billion to holders of AAA-rated asset-backed
securities and recently originated consumer and small business loans.

•

December 29, 2008. The U.S. Treasury Department announces that it will
purchase $5 billion in equity from GMAC.

•

January 16, 2009. The U.S. Treasury Department announces that it will lend $1.5
billion to Chrysler Financial to finance the extension of new consumer auto loans.

•

February 10, 2009. The Fed announces that is prepared to expand the TALF to as
much as $1 trillion and broaden the eligible collateral to include AAA-rated
commercial mortgage-backed securities, private-label residential mortgagebacked securities, and other asset-backed securities.

•

March 18, 2009. The FOMC votes to maintain the target range for the effective
federal funds at 0 to 0.25 percent and decides to increase the size of the Federal
Reserve's balance sheet by purchasing up to $750 billion of agency mortgagebacked securities, bringing its total purchases of these securities to up to $1.25
trillion, and to increase its purchases of agency debt by up to $100 billion to a
total of up to $200 billion.

As of the week ended on October 27, 2010, the Fed held $1.06 trillion of MBS,
$834 billion of Treasury and $150 billion of agency securities. The total assets amounted
to $2.3 trillion, almost three times the pre-crisis level. To finance these assets, the Fed
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borrowed more than $1 trillion from depository institutions (in the form of excess
reserves) and about $240 billion from the Treasury Department via special lines of credit.
Starting in late November 2008, the Fed focused on stimulating the economy by
expanding its balance sheet through acquiring longer-term assets.
The point of this discussion is to show the dramatic change in Fed/government
policy during the financial crisis. Prior to the Lehman bankruptcy the Fed provided
liquidity to the market. After the Lehman bankruptcy the Fed and the Treasury became
active investors to address specific problems. Griffiths, Kotomin and Winters (2011)
examine the commercial paper market across the financial crisis and find little evidence
that Fed liquidity facilities in the pre-Lehman period reduced the impact of the crisis, but
that later when the Fed became a lender in the CP market, the crisis pressures were
dramatically reduced.

V.

Policy Implications and Conclusion
Our review of the role of the money markets during the recent financial crisis

leads to several future policy implications.
•

Money market lenders require the preservation of their funds. When they have
concerns about their funds they will withdraw to the sidelines and liquidity
enhancements will not get them back in the game. Said another way, lenders do
not make bad loans but they do make some loans that go bad.

Liquidity

enhancement will not convince a lender to make a bad loan. Instead, credit
enhancement is required to improve the quality of the loan.
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•

As long as the shadow banking sector funds long-term assets with short-term
loans, it will be exposed to liquidity risk, the ability to roll over its loans on a
continuing basis. Since this sector borrows in the money markets, its ability to
roll over loans is based solely on the lenders’ confidence in the ongoing credit
quality of borrowers’ assets. Policy makers and investors being aware of this risk
will make investors more reluctant to take on counterparty credit risk and will
provide policy makers a clearer path to a solution.

•

Over time the money markets have evolved to include many securities and
programs that do not fit the traditional definition of a money market security;
money markets are not what they used to be. Investors have to be more diligent to
be informed about the borrower and the borrower’s assets.

Following the

financial crisis we see a push in this direction by policy makers. Rule 2a-7 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (as amended) defines the assets that can be held
in a MMF, and following the financial crisis the SEC has modified the rule to
move back toward a more traditional definition of money market securities.
•

During the crisis, some money market borrowers could not credibly signal
repayment. For example, there was much news about toxic assets in mortgagebacked securities, but no one could determine which mortgage-backed facilities
held the toxic assets. One result was the asset-backed CP market as a whole
declined dramatically as the lenders stood on the sidelines.

Making funds

available to lenders (providing liquidity) did not matter without a credible signal
of repayment. Policy makers need to develop techniques that increase the
transparency of portfolio holdings in conduits, SIVs and SPVs.
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The point of this paper is that when money markets cease to function normally,
the source of the problem can be a lack of liquidity and/or a lack of confidence. During a
crisis that includes questions over the correct valuation of assets, any problem in the
money markets may well be a lack of confidence which cannot be overcome simply by
providing more liquidity. There is clear evidence that the current crisis was one of
confidence given the flight to quality in T-bills, the decline in amounts outstanding of
higher risk CP, securities firms having difficulties funding their operations through repos,
and banks holding over $1 trillion in excess reserves.
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Footnotes
1. Taylor and Williams (2009) suggest that the current financial crisis commenced in
earnest with BNP. A timeline of the financial crisis developed by the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis lists 10 items before the BNP announcement, but none would be
considered a major trigger of the financial crisis. The timeline is available at
http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline. Brunnermeier (2009) also provides
an excellent timeline of institutional events commencing with an increase in subprime
mortgage defaults in February 2007 and the increase in the cost of insuring baskets of
mortgages with credit default swaps as measured by the ABX price index.
2. The $32.2 billion in mortgages held for sale includes $22.5 billion in prime mortgages
and $4.9 billion in non-prime mortgages. The Trading Securities Owned are almost
entirely mortgage-backed securities.
3. The funding of mortgage operations and mortgage-backed securities with asset-backed
commercial paper was common practice prior to the financial crisis. Covitz, Liang, and
Suarez (2009) note that about one-third of asset-backed CP programs failed to roll over
their issues within a week in the late 2007.
4. The quote is from the executive summary of the Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner
in the Lehman bankruptcy case, accessed at http://lehmanreport.jenner.com.
5. We recognize that most commercial paper is rolled over, but this is consistent with most
inventory being replaced.
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6. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990, 1993) define bank debt as being “informationallyinsensitive” when such bonds are not subject to adverse information because it is not
profitable to produce private information to speculate in these bonds.
7. This number significantly underestimates the use of repos as only the trades of those
institutions authorized to trade directly with the Federal Reserve are reported but hedge
funds, money market mutual funds and other institutions with large portfolios of
securities also participate in this market.
8. See Cyree, Lindley and Winters (2007). Stigum and Crescenzi (2007) note that the
market peaked at $80 billion outstanding in 1984 and declined to only $4 billion in 2006.
9. The Treasury discontinued auctioning 1-year T-bills after the 2/27/01 auction and restarted regular 1-year T-bill auctions with at the 6/3/08 auction.
10. This limit was raised to $250,000 on October 3, 2008, the increase authorized by the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
11. Consistent with Markowitz Portfolio Theory, the argument is that the risk of a portfolio
of risky assets is less than any single risky asset. Hence the risk of, say, a pool of subprime mortgages could be split into tranches ranked AAA through BBB and lower.
However, when valuations became uncertain, correlations become positive and the
benefit of diversification reduces dramatically.
12. Adrian and Shin (2010, p.6) report that, “(f)or an off-balance sheet vehicle such as a SIV
. . . that finances holdings of mortgage assets by issuing commercial paper, a difference
of a quarter or half percent in the funding cost may make all the difference between a
profitable venture and a loss-making one.”
49

13. Quoting from the Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability Neel Kashkari’s
speech made on January 13, 2009: “As a result, credit markets froze. The commercial
paper market shut down, 3-month Treasuries dipped below zero, and a money market
mutual fund "broke the buck" for only the second time in history, precipitating a $200
billion net outflow of funds from that market. The savings of millions of Americans and
the ability of businesses and consumers to access affordable credit were put at serious
risk.”
14. The data is available from the Federal Reserve at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/statisticsdata.htm. The Fed does not
provide the amount outstanding in different rating classes. The CP data is available in
different maturities. Plots of different maturities are similar to the plots in Figure 4.
15. For readers who want a more in-depth discussion of the changes in the CP market we
suggest Griffiths, Kotomin and Winters (2011) and a Federal Reserve Board working
paper by Cohen-Cole, Monotorial-Garriga, Suarez and Wu (2010) that reaches the same
conclusion.
16. The first case of a money market fund breaking the buck occurred in 1994, when
Community Bankers U.S. Government Money Market Fund was liquidated at 94 cents
because of large losses in derivatives.
17. Highest-rated (AA) non-financial CP issues did not appear to suffer from lower liquidity
or higher yields. However, this segment is the smallest in the CP market (between 10%
and 15% of outstanding CP).
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18. Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) rate represents the expected interest rate that would
accrue from repeatedly rolling over an investment at the overnight rate for three months.
19. The Fed used the term "matched sale" instead of "reverse repo" before 2003.
20. Collateral pledged by dealers towards repos has a haircut applied, while collateral
pledged by the Fed in reverse repos does not.
21. See Duffie (1996) for a detailed discussion of special repos.
22. See the white paper prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York titled Tri-Party
Repo Infrastructure Reform.
23. See Hordahl and King (2008).
24. In a repo fail, the promise to deliver a security on time is not kept, as the bonds cannot be
borrowed and then loaned back out.
25. A non-exhaustive listing includes: [1] the Government of Singapore Investment Corp.
and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority invested $14.4 billion in Citigroup, [2] the Kuwait
Investment Authority, the Korean Investment Corp. and Singapore's state-run Temasek
Holdings invested about $10 billion in Merrill Lynch, [3] China Investment Corp.
invested $5 billion in Morgan Stanley, [4] China's government-controlled Citic Securities
Co. and U.S. investment bank Bear Stearns agreed to invest $1 billion in each other, [5]
Abu Dhabi-based Mubadala Development Co. invested $1.35 billion in The Carlyle
Group, a private equity firm. And [6] China's state investment company invested $3
billion in The Blackstone Group, a U.S. private equity firm.
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26. The discussion that follows is based on Section III.A.4 of the Report of Anton R.
Valukas, Examiner in the Lehman’s bankruptcy case. Consult the report for details;
accessible at http://lehmanreport.jenner.com.
27. The “105” and “108” refer to the haircuts of 5% and 8% necessary to account for the
transaction as a “sale” under SFAS 140. Lehman utilized Treasury and agency securities
in “Repo 105” transactions and equity securities in “Repo 108” transactions.
28. For example, in the first quarter of 2008 (ending February 28), Lehman’s reported net
leverage ratio (net assets-to-equity) was 15.4. If Repo 105s and 108s were not classified
as sales, it would have been 17.3.
29. Lines of credit are used in the fed funds market for two reasons. First, it allows the
lending bank to go through a formal credit analysis for all banks wishing to borrow from
it. In this process, the lender determines if it is willing to lend to the borrower and, if so,
a maximum loan amount for the line of credit. Second, requiring pre-approved lines of
credit allows a transaction request to be completed quickly. When a request comes to the
lender, a clerk simply checks to see if a line of credit is in place and if the requested loan
amount is less than the amount available under the line of credit. If so, the clerk makes
the loan; if not, the clerk rejects the loan request.
30. See Feinman (1993) for a discussion of how the Federal Reserve reacts to deviation of
market rates from the policy target rate.
31. However, the American Banker reported that the move to paying interest is designed to
keep the deposits at the Fed so the Fed could make more loans as it increases access to
the discount window and as it began to make a market in commercial paper. The
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European Central Bank has paid interest on reserves since introduction of the Euro in
1999.
32. See Griffiths, Kotomin and Winters (2011) who report results from the Federal Reserve
survey of senior bank loan officers on changes in lending practice in advance of FOMC
meetings. They find that credit standards began to tighten just prior to BNP (8/9/07) and
that the tightening peaked around Lehman (9/15/08).
33. We recommend the following links for more details:
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/FRcollguidelines.pdf and
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/discountwindowbook.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=43#eligi
bility.
34. Most depositories, however, were still reluctant to borrow from the Fed’s discount
window.
35. Frame (2008) provides an early analysis of the government intervention into Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.
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